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ABSTRACT: A popular definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are 
epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues 
and share the same evidence about the targeted issue. In this paper I shall take up the 
challenge of defending the necessity of the evidential equality condition for a definition 
of epistemic peerage from criticisms that can be elicited from the literature on peer 
disagreement. The paper discusses two definitions that drop this condition and argues 
that they yield implausible verdicts about the instantiation of the epistemic peerage 
relation. 
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1. No evidential equality for epistemic peerage: the case of philosophical disagreement 
A widely endorsed definition of epistemic peerage maintains that two subjects are 
epistemic peers if and only if they are equals with respect to general epistemic 
virtues and share the same evidence about the targeted issue.1 Call any definition 
that encapsulates the necessity of the evidential equality condition a standard 
definition of epistemic peerage. 
In  a  recent  article  appeared  in  this  journal,  Nicolás Lo Guercio2 has argued 
that in order to satisfactorily address the issue of philosophical peer disagreement 
one must take into account two distinct concepts of epistemic peerage that give up 
the evidential equality condition. Lo Guercio calls these two concepts strong and 
weak epistemic peerage. Let me quote the definitions he proposes: 
                                                                
1 See   for   instance   Bryan   Frances,   “The   Reflective   Epistemic   Renegade,”   Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 81,   2   (2010):   424,   Thomas   Kelly,   “The   Epistemic   Significance   of  
Disagreement,”   in  Oxford Studies in Epistemology,  vol.  1,  eds.  Tamar  Szabó  Gendler  and  John  
Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 173-4,   Jennifer  Lackey,   “A   Justificationist  
View   of   Disagreement’s   Epistemic   Significance,”   in   Social Epistemology, eds. Alan Millar, 
Adrian Haddock, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 302. 
2 Nicolás  Lo  Guercio,  “Philosophical  Peer  Disagreement,”  Logos & Episteme 3, 3 (2012): 459-67. 
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Strong Epistemic Peer: Two agents are strong epistemic peers when (1) they have 
approximately the same epistemic virtues, (2) they acknowledge the same facts 
and (3) their epistemic perspectives are sufficiently alike. 
Weak Epistemic Peer: Two agents are weak epistemic peers when (1) they have 
approximately the same epistemic virtues, (2) they acknowledge the same facts 
but (3) their epistemic perspectives relevantly diverge.3 
The rationale of this distinction is, roughly put, the following. As far as 
philosophical  discourse  is  concerned,  we’d  better  rule  out  the  evidential  equality  
condition since a certain item i counts   as   evidence  only   relatively   to   a   subject’s  
epistemic perspective.   A   subject’s   epistemic   perspective   is   constituted   by   the  
subject’s   norms,   policies   and   methodological   commitments.   To   illustrate   this  
point, Lo Guercio considers the case of intuitions: some philosophers maintain 
that intuitions are evidence; others  say  that  they  aren’t.  However,  friends  and  foes  
of the evidential status of intuitions can share the fact of having a certain 
intuition. Lo Guercio contends that once we admit the possibility that two 
philosophers can acknowledge the same facts yet they have relevantly divergent 
epistemic perspectives, we should make room for two distinct responses to peer 
disagreement. When two subjects are strong epistemic peers, they should adopt a 
conciliatory stance; when they are weak epistemic peers, on the contrary, they are 
entitled to stick to their guns. Call any definition that drops the evidential equality 
condition a nonstandard definition of epistemic peerage. 
Lo  Guercio  doesn’t  discuss  (1)  by  contending  that  it  is  widely  granted  in  the  
debate. I will follow him and leave a detailed analysis of (1) for another occasion. 
The   first  wrinkle   in  Lo  Guercio’s   argument   is   that   there   is  no  mention  of  
the fact that the problem of epistemic peer disagreement arises not simply when 
two subjects instantiate the epistemic peerage relation but when they take 
themselves to instantiate it. Call this the acknowledgment condition. 
The acknowledgement condition plays a crucial role in the issue of what 
doxastic attitude the individuals should adopt after the discovery of a 
disagreement with a peer. If one were not aware that one is in an epistemic peer 
disagreement,   then  one  wouldn’t  even  consider   that  disagreement  could  play  an  
evidential role. To put it roughly: how can I rationally respond to peer 
disagreement (no matter what  this  response  should  be)  if  I’m  not  aware  that  I  am  
in a peer disagreement? 
In addition, it has been pointed out that one should have good reasons for 
thinking   that   one’s   opponent   is   one’s   epistemic   peer.4 This appears to be a 
                                                                
3 Lo  Guercio,  “Philosophical  Peer  Disagreement,”  462. 
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plausible requirement: why  should   I   adopt  a  certain  epistemic  practice   if   I  don’t  
have good reasons for thinking that the necessary condition that triggers that very 
behaviour is satisfied? To put the point differently, it is unclear why I should 
adopt a certain response to peer disagreement  if  I  don’t  have  good  reasons  to  think  
that  the  subject  I’m  disagreeing  with  is  my  epistemic  peer. 
The   second   minor   qualm   I   have   about   Lo   Guercio’s   proposal   targets   his  
explanation  of  the  notion  of  evidence.  Lo  Guercio  claims  that  “being  evidence is 
not a straightforwardly factual property, but a property that a proposition has only 
relative  to  some  system  of  epistemic  norms,  policies  […].”5 Lo Guercio maintains 
that two people can be strong epistemic peers if they have the same perspective; 
having   the   same   perspective   amounts   to   taking   the   same   “facts”   as   evidence;;  
intuitions   are   such   facts.   As   far   as   I   can   see,   the   only   reading   of   “fact”   that   is  
compatible with the satisfaction of (2) in both definitions of epistemic peerage has 
it that subjects acknowledge that they have the same intuition. In my view, 
having the same intuition means that both subjects have the occurrent, attitudinal 
mental state of intuiting that p. The talk of sameness of facts is accounted for at 
the level of types of facts, as   it  were.  Although   subjects   can’t   literally   have   the  
same   token   experiential   mental   states,   i.e.   they   can’t   literally   have   the   same  
intuitions,  these  tokens  are  of  the  same  experiential  mental  type.  If  we  don’t  share  
an epistemic perspective, the intuition  doesn’t   count  as  evidence;;   if  we  do  share  
the perspective, we both take our intuitions to be evidence. More specifically, 
what we do is to take the mental state of intuiting that p to be evidence about a 
certain philosophical problem. And yet, this is inconsistent with the claim made 
by Lo Guercio and cited above to the effect that evidence is a property of 
propositions. For given the second condition of epistemic peerage proposed by Lo 
Guercio, evidence should be a property of mental states, i.e. the intuiting that p. 
Having said that, let us move on to canvass the tenability of the distinction 
between weak and strong epistemic peers. As far as I can see, the concept of weak 
epistemic peerage should allow us to establish that disagreement between 
philosophers   who   don’t   share   an   epistemic   perspective   yet   have   the   same  
intuitions can be safely regarded as a disagreement among epistemic peers. To 
assess  this  idea,  let  us  avail  ourselves  of  Timothy  Williamson’s  example  of  the  two  
                                                                                                                                       
4 See  for  instance  David  Enoch,  “Not  Just  a  Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too 
Seriously)   in   Cases   of   Peer   Disagreement,”   Mind 119, 476 (2010): 973, Nathan L. King, 
“Disagreement:   What’s   the   Problem?   Or   a   Good   Peer   is   Hard    to Find,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, online first: DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-  1592.2010.00441.x (20111): 13, 
Lackey,  “A  Justificationist  View,”  304. 
5 Lo  Guercio,  “Philosophical  Peer  Disagreement,”  460,  emphasis  mine. 
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epistemologists who disagree about the import of the Gettier cases.6 The example 
goes as follows. A philosopher thinks that the Gettier intuition, viz. the intuition 
that a subject Gettier-related to a proposition p has a justified true belief in p that 
doesn’t  amount   to  knowledge,   shows  that  knowledge   isn’t  equivalent   to   justified  
true belief; the other thinks that what Gettier cases show varies depending on 
cultural and socio-economic background. They disagree on the evidential role of 
the Gettier intuition though they both have that intuition. To put it in Lo 
Guercio’s  lingo,  they  share  the  fact  of  intuiting  that  a  subject  in  a  Gettier  scenario  
has a true justified belief in p without knowing it, yet they disagree about the 
thesis that this psychological fact is an epistemic fact. That is, they disagree on the 
thesis that this intuition plays an evidential role. On closer inspection, the only 
epistemic component of both definitions of epistemic peerage offered by Lo 
Guercio that is satisfied in such a case is (1), that is, the idea that subjects have 
approximately the same epistemic virtues. To see this, notice that philosophers 
don’t   share   the  epistemic  perspective,  and notice also that the second condition, 
i.e. sharing the fact of intuiting that p, is an admittedly non-epistemic component 
of both definitions. 
Let us pause on the claim that philosophers who share these general 
epistemic virtues are (weak) epistemic peers. The first thing that must be 
emphasised   is   that   this   idea   also   emerges   from   Gary   Gutting’s   definition   of  
epistemic peerage. Gutting contends that two individuals are epistemic peers if 
they  are  equals  with  respect  to  factors  such  as  “intelligence,  perspicacity,  honesty,  
thoroughness,   and   other   relevant   epistemic   virtues.”7 Therefore, the notion of 
weak epistemic peerage  proposed  by  Lo  Guercio  collapses  into  Gutting’s  once  we  
deal with a case of two philosophers who disagree on the evidential import of the 
Gettier intuition because of two different epistemic perspectives.8 
Having clarified this, let us see whether this strategy successfully 
undermines the necessity of the evidential equality condition.  
Consider the following scenario. Jennifer and Lucille are talking about what 
it takes to know a certain proposition. Jennifer is a professional philosopher, 
whereas Lucille is a professional computer scientist. Both Jennifer and Lucille, 
when  presented  with  Gettier  cases,  have  the  intuition  that  gettiered  beliefs  don’t  
amount to knowledge. Jennifer and Lucille regard with esteem each other: they 
                                                                
6 Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 211. 
7 Gary Gutting, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 1982), 83. 
8 To  forestall  misunderstandings,  I’m  not  claiming  that  Lo  Guercio’s  definition  always  collapses 
into  Gutting’s. 
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take themselves to be equally thoughtful, intelligent careful and honest. 
Therefore, Jennifer and Lucille satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of weak epistemic 
peerage. And yet, Jennifer takes the Gettier intuition to be evidence about the 
problem   at   stake,   whereas   Lucille   doesn’t.   More   generally, their respective 
epistemic perspectives seem to relevantly diverge. 
This is a clear case of philosophical disagreement, for two subjects are 
disagreeing about a philosophical problem, i.e. the definition of knowledge. The 
question that needs to be raised, to my mind, is whether Jennifer and Lucille take 
themselves to be epistemic peers at all, no matter how weak the sense of epistemic 
peerage could be. 
To address this question, let us suppose that both Jennifer and Lucille are 
aware of the fact that a good conception of knowledge has to avoid the threat of 
external  world  scepticism,  viz.  the  thesis  that  we  don’t  know  whether  there  is  an  
external world. Lucille is acquainted with some of the most famous issues 
revolving around the problem of scepticism. She knows the difference between 
Cartesian and Humean scepticism; she knows the difference between scepticism 
and  idealism;;  and  she  is  also  aware  of  Hilary  Putnam’s  nowadays-famous thought 
experiment of the brains in a vat. The brain in a vat scenario is a typical sceptical 
scenario: it stipulates that brains in a vat (henceforth BIV) would have 
qualitatively  identical  thoughts  to  those  unenvatted.  When  a  BIV  says  “There  is  a  
hand   before   me”,   there   is   in   fact   no   hand   before   him,   only   a   simulated   hand  
produced by the supercomputers that stimulate the envatted brains. Putnam offers 
a semantic solution to this sceptical challenge: accordingly, if we adopt semantic 
externalism,  it  turns  out  that  the  sentence  “We  are  brain  in  a  vat”  is  false.  Lucille  is  
persuaded  by  Putnam’s  argument.  Therefore,   she  thinks  that  Putnam’s  argument  
carries the day against the BIV hypothesis and avoids scepticism. However, Lucille 
isn’t  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  argument  from  semantic  externalism  does  not  affect  
certain versions of the BIV scenario. Take the following case.9 Suppose that my 
brain was removed from my body last night and is now, for the first time ever, in a 
vat, with appropriate virtual reality hookups. In this case, semantic externalism 
cannot avoid scepticism. The take home message is that we can reproduce a 
sceptical scenario no matter what theory of reference we endorse. By contrast, 
Jennifer is aware of this piece of evidence that bears on the problem of scepticism 
which is also evidence on the problem of knowledge, for she is a professional 
philosophers and is acquainted with all data bearing on this philosophical issue. 
                                                                
9 See  Crispin  Wright,  “On  Putnam’s  Proof  That  We  Are  Not  Brains-in-a-Vat,”  Proceedings  of 
the Aristotelian Society 92 (1992): 67–94. 
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In light of this example, I think that it would be too bald a contention to say 
that Jennifer takes Lucille to be her epistemic peer on the issue of knowledge. 
Indeed there is a clear epistemic difference between two subjects that seem to 
matter  once  we  have  to  establish  whether  Jennifer  shouldn’t  change  her  doxastic  
attitude after the discovery of disagreement with Jennifer. The epistemic 
difference lays in a different familiarity with the evidence about the problem of 
knowledge. Jennifer could (and should) maintain that her friend has 
underestimated  the  force  of  the  sceptical  challenge  since  she  isn’t  aware  of  some  
crucial evidence, i.e. semantic  externalism  can’t  rule  out  some  sceptical  scenarios. 
This is a concrete example where, in order to establish the instantiation of 
the epistemic peerage relation, two subjects should look at considerations 
concerning evidential equality. Moreover, since subjects should have good reasons 
for taking themselves to be epistemic peers, this example shows that Jennifer had 
better not take Lucille to be her epistemic peer since she has a reason for doing so. 
The reason is that Lucille is ignoring an evidential datum in the assessment of how 
the problem of scepticism bears on the definition of knowledge. Notice moreover 
that the example is independent of whether Lucille and Jennifer have similar 
epistemic perspectives. Indeed, even if they both took the Gettier intuition to be 
evidence, Lucille still wouldn't have access to an important piece of evidence on 
the problem of knowledge. 
As far as I can see, Jennifer has good reasons for not taking Lucille to be her 
epistemic peer at all. More generally, considerations about possession of evidence 
or lack thereof seem to be good candidates for playing the role of those epistemic 
reasons   one   can   appeal   to   in   order   to   adjudicate   one’s   opponent’s   epistemic  
credentials.  By  contrast,  it’s  by  no  means  clear  how  a  definition  epistemic peerage 
that rules out evidential equality manages to satisfy the plausible requirement that 
subjects should have reasons for taking themselves to be epistemic peers. I surmise 
that enemies of the necessity of the evidential equality condition could parry this 
concern by claiming that the only reason subjects should look at is the track 
record of success. However, this contention relies on the unwarranted assumption 
that we can really get to a comparison between track records of success in 
philosophy. And yet, it is far from being obvious to maintain that history of 
philosophy is the history of a progress that, time to time, moves closer to the truth 
and to say that there is a well-established track record of progress in philosophy. I 
can’t  fully  address this topic in this paper. Therefore, I content myself with saying 
that   the   appeal   to   track   record   of   success   isn’t   easily   available   in   domains   of  
discourse like philosophy. 
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In my view, the foregoing analysis provides sufficient grounds to reject Lo 
Guercio’s  nonstandard  definitions  of  epistemic  peerage. 
2. Replacing Evidence with Likelihood 
Another account of epistemic peerage that rejects the necessity of the evidential 
equality condition may be derived from the work of Adam Elga. Let me start off 
with quoting his definition of epistemic peerage:10 
You count your friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about- to-be-
judged claim if and only if you think that, conditional the two of you disagreeing 
about the claim, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken.11 
Elga does not mention evidential equality and intellectual virtues because 
he emphasises the connection between the beliefs held by two subjects and the 
notion of mistake. That is to say, his definition aims at capturing the relation 
between belief and truth without pausing on the epistemic features that may 
secure this tie, e.g. evidential support. 
Elga’s  nonstandard12 definition of epistemic peerage makes a more general 
case for the rejection of the necessity of the evidential equality condition for 
epistemic  peerage  than  Lo  Guercio’s  does,  for  it  isn’t  narrowed  to  a  single  area  of  
discourse.   To   understand   better   the   import   of   Elga’s   definition,   Ernest   Sosa   has  
suggested   to   the   effect   that   Elga   and  Kelly’s   definitions   collapse   into   one   if we 
interpret the notion of being equally likely to be mistaken as relying on the 
evidence and the epistemic virtues enjoyed by subjects.13 That is to say, if the 
notion of likelihood were relative to the conditions posited by the standard 
definition, then the two definitions would de facto state the same conditions. 
However  plausible  Sosa’s  interpretation  may  be,  I  take  it  that  the  real  virtue  
of   accepting  Elga’s   conception   springs   from  a  different   conception  of   likelihood,  
that is, a conception that interprets this notion only relatively to the notion of 
truth. Furthermore, Elga explicitly says that his use of epistemic peers is 
nonstandard by thus differentiating his notion of epistemic peerage from the 
standard one proposed, for instance, by Thomas Kelly. Therefore, it seems to me 
                                                                
10 David  Enoch   endorses   a   somewhat   similar  definition.  He   claims   to   follow  Elga’s  definition.  
See  Enoch,  “Not  Just  a  Truthometer,”  956. 
11 Adam  Elga,  “Reflection  and  Disagreement,”  Noûs 41/3 (2007): 499 fn. 21 
12 Notice  that  Elga  explicitly  uses  this  label,  see  Elga,  “Reflection  and  Disagreement,”  499,  fn.  21. 
13 See   Ernest   Sosa,   “The   Epistemology   of   Disagreement,”   in   Social Epistemology, eds. Millar, 
Haddock, and Pritchard, 278–297. 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fair to say that Elga is really proposing a different definition of epistemic peerage 
that  doesn’t  encapsulate  the  necessity  of  the  evidential  equality  condition. 
Elga’s   definition   opens   up   an   important   issue   concerning the nature of 
epistemic   peerage.   In   my   view,   if   we   adopted   Elga’s   definition,   the   notion   of  
epistemic  peerage  would  merely  rely  on  the  external  tie  between  subjects’  beliefs  
and their probability of being mistaken or, conversely, right. That is, peerage 
depends on the  fact  that  subjects’  beliefs  are  equally  connected,  i.e.  have  the  same  
likelihood,  to  truth  or  falsity.  To  put  it  differently,  it’s  the  equal  degree  of  truth-
conduciveness that guarantees the satisfaction of the peerage relation irrespective 
of subjects’  evidence  and  intellectual  virtues.  By  contrast,  the  standard  definition  
puts   to  emphasis  on  aspects   that  pertain  the  subject’s   internal condition, viz. the 
evidence and the intellectual virtues she possesses. 
Having  said  that,  let  me  quote  Elga’s  defense of this nonstandard definition:  
In defense of my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of you 
disagreeing about a claim, your friend is more likely than you to be mistaken. 
Then however intelligent, perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and 
unbiased you may think your friend is, it would seem odd to count her as an 
epistemic peer with respect to that claim, at least on that occasion. You think 
that on the supposition that there is disagreement, she is more likely to get things 
wrong.14  
To my mind, this defense is not completely exempt from criticism. To 
illustrate   my   concern,   let   us   unpack   Elga’s   defense   a   little.   One   goes   from   the  
supposition that there is disagreement, to the conclusion that her friend is more 
likely than oneself to be mistaken. It must be stressed that Elga does not invoke 
the idea that the subject has independent reasons for thinking that her opponent, 
although equally intelligent and informed, is more likely than her to be mistaken. 
That   is   to   say,   it   isn’t required here that the subject has some evidence for the 
claim that her opponent is more likely than her to be mistaken. 
As   far   as   I   can   see,   Elga’s   defense   is   flawed   because   it’s   not   sufficient   to  
think that the other is more likely to be mistaken in order to demote his epistemic 
condition: one needs reasons for claiming that the opponent is not a peer. 
Otherwise,   this   way   of   demoting   one’s   epistemic   condition   would   be   totally  
arbitrary. So, I contend that even a proponent of the nonstandard definition 
advanced   by   Elga   has   to   supply   reasons   for   demoting   the   opponent’s   epistemic  
credentials.  What  could  these  reasons  be?  It  seems  to  me  that  a  supporter  of  Elga’s  
account   has   little   room   of   manoeuvre   here,   for   since   she   doesn’t   appeal   to  
evidence, she could only appeal to a comparison between track records. By 
                                                                
14 Elga,  “Reflection  and  Disagreement,”  499,  fn.  21. 
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contrast, a supporter of the internal conception of epistemic peerage has more 
than one arrow to her bow, for she could appeal to issues bearing on the 
possession of certain pieces of evidence; or to the different familiarity with that 
same evidence; or to the lack of a certain intellectual virtue that is particular 
salient in the targeted domain and so on and so forth.  
However  it  may  be,  let  us  evaluate  Elga’s  definition  for  its  ability  to  handle  
cases in which we would be inclined to attribute epistemic peerage to the 
individuals.   Jennifer   Lackey   objected   to   Elga’s   definition   by   proposing   the  
following case:  
(BIRDS) 
June may be a complete novice with respect to identifying birds of prey, and Jill 
may be an expert ornithologist. When June is sober and Jill is highly intoxicated, 
however, we may be equally likely to be mistaken about whether the bird flying 
overhead is an osprey.15  
Lackey’s  case  emphasises  the  blindness  of  this  definition  to  factors  that  may 
pertain  to  the  appraisal  of  the  subjects’  epistemic  credentials.  Let  us  try  to  enhance  
this line of criticism by thinking at the following scenario. 
Suppose that Herman, son of a famous clairvoyant, under certain conditions 
that usually obtain, is an unwitting reliable clairvoyant weather forecaster. He 
possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility 
of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day 
Herman forms the belief that it will rain tomorrow morning in Paris, though he 
has no evidence either for or against his belief. Consider now Paul. He is a 
professional weather forecaster. He knows all the observational systems, he is 
aware of the best forecasting techniques, numerical forecast models and so on. 
Considered all the evidence and the best available techniques for analysing it, he 
forms the belief that it will rain tomorrow morning in Paris. Suppose now that 
Herman and Paul know each other as experienced weather forecasters; suppose 
moreover that in the majority of cases they are in agreement, and when they 
disagree, Herman is right as often as Paul is. Hence, Paul counts Herman as 
epistemic peer, for they are equally likely to get things right. And yet, this strikes 
me as an awkward result, for there is a glaring epistemic asymmetry between 
them. Indeed, whereas Paul can warrant his judgments by arguing for them 
relying on his competent analysis of the evidence, Herman cannot warrant his 
judgments unless we grant him an inductive or abductive strategy that appeals to 
his track record of success. Intuitively, besides inductive or abductive ways of 
warranting   his   predictions,   Herman   doesn’t   have   any   reason   for   making   the  
                                                                
15 Lackey,  “A  Justificationist  View,”  fn.  17. 
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judgments he makes about weather forecasting. He does not have internal reasons 
for supporting his own claim, for he does not possess any evidence in favour of his 
predictions. 
The problem we are facing is the following. If the peerage relation is 
established on the basis of an external relation only, that is, if the individuals are 
peer only if the same degree of truth-conduciveness obtains, then we should take 
Herman and Paul as to be epistemic peers. And yet, it seems prima facie plausible 
to claim that Herman and Paul are in two very different epistemic conditions, for 
Paul can disclose his own evidence in favour of the judgments and competently 
explain what kind of reasoning has led him to conclude that p. It is worth stressing 
that  nothing  of  what  I’ve  said  so  far  is  meant  to  argue  against  the  idea  that  Paul  
and Herman enjoy the same degree of truth-conduciveness. As far as I can see, it 
could  well  be   the  case  that   they  are  equally   likely  to  be  mistaken  as   in  Lackey’s  
case about birds, but this equal likelihood stems from two very different epistemic 
conditions. These epistemic disparities can be reflected in their epistemic 
practices. Suppose indeed that Paul and Herman are in disagreement about a 
prediction and come to a situation of full disclosure in which they have to explain 
why   they’ve   reached  opposite  conclusions about whether it will rain tomorrow. 
Well, it seems clear that Paul is better equipped than Herman when a defense of 
their weather predictions is concerned. For Paul can cite his measurements, data, 
and reasonings about the issue. By contrast, Herman would admit his total absence 
of evidence on the problem and his inability of defending his predictions. At any 
rate,  if  we  embraced  Elga’s  definition,  all  these  plausible  considerations  wouldn’t  
have any weight on how to establish the instantiation of the epistemic peerage 
relation. For what is relevant for epistemic peerage is the likelihood of being right; 
since Herman and Paul are on a par with respect to this aspect even after full 
disclosure,  Paul  couldn’t  stop  counting  Herman  as  his  peer  simply  by arguing that 
Herman has no evidence whatsoever about weather forecasting. Why do these 
considerations are not available to the supporter of the nonstandard definition of 
epistemic peerage advocated by Elga? If they were, the notion of likelihood should 
be interpreted in the way suggested by Sosa. And yet, if this were the case, we 
should conclude that the standard and the nonstandard definition collapse into 
one another.  
The foregoing discussion allows me to claim that in order for Paul to have 
good reasons  that  allow  him  to  properly  evaluate  Herman’s  epistemic  credentials  
and not regard him as an epistemic peer, considerations about evidence are 
necessary. 
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Conclusion 
The main purpose of the paper was to discuss two attempts of defining epistemic 
peerage that   don’t   take   evidential   equality   to   be   a   necessary   condition   for  
epistemic peerage. In my view, both attempts fail to yield highly plausible and 
intuitive verdicts about the acknowledgment of the instantiation of the epistemic 
peerage relation in some scenarios.   I’ve   tried   to   show   that   correct   verdicts   are  
yielded once we acknowledge that the notion evidence plays a crucial role in the 
evaluation   of   subjects’   epistemic   credentials.   In   my   view,   the   nonstandard  
definitions advocated by Lo Guercio and Elga don’t   succeed   in  undermining   the  
contention that evidential equality is a necessary condition for epistemic 
peerage.16 
 
                                                                
16 I am grateful to Fernando Broncano-Berrocal for helpful comments and discussion. 
